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Prior to a spacewalk during the NASA STS/129 mission in November 2009,
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) correspondent William Harwood reported
astronauts, "were awakened again", as they had been the day previously. Fearing
something not properly connected was causing a leak, the crew, both on the ground and
in space, stopped and checked everything.
The alarm proved false. The crew did complete its work ahead of schedule, but
the incident reminds us that correctly connecting hundreds and thousands of entities,
subsystems and systems, finding leaks, loosening stuck valves, and adding replacements
to very large complex systems over time does not occur magically.
Everywhere major projects present similar pressures. Lives are at - risk.
Responsibility is heavy.
Large natural and human-created disasters introduce parallel difficulties as people
work across boundaries—their countries, disciplines, languages, and cultures—with
known immediate dangers as well as the unexpected.
NASA has long accepted that when humans have to go where humans cannot go
that simulation is the sole solution. The Agency uses simulation to achieve consensus,
reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, understand problems, make decisions, support design,
do planning and troubleshooting, as well as for operations, training, testing, and
evaluation.
Simulation is at the heart of all such complex systems, products, projects,
programs, and events. Difficult, hazardous short and, especially, long-term activities have
a persistent need for simulation from the first insight into a possibly workable idea or
answer until the final report—perhaps beyond our lifetime—is put in the archive. With
simulation we create a common mental model, try-out breakdowns of machinery or
teamwork, and find opportunity for improvement. Lifecycle simulation proves to be
increasingly important as risks and consequences intensify.
Across the world, disasters are increasing. We anticipate more of them, as the
results of global warming prove more and more ominous-glaciers melting in Bolivia,
floods in Saudi Arabia, the Maldives sinking and salt rising along the Nile. Fear grows
about potential asteroid crashes and nightly television images raise awareness of victims
of floods, hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons, fire, tornado, tsunami, bombings,
landslides, and cross-boundary criminality.
The Red Cross says that disasters impact 250 million people each year. That
means that 700,000 people are having a very bad day today.
Modeling and simulation is and must be part of the solution. We need resilient
people, land, economy, and governance. We want less risk, fewer consequential errors
and more affordability in our large projects whether digging a tunnel through a mountain,
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exploring under the sea, reconstructing a city, creating a new transportation or power
system or an innovative space craft.
The need for more effective planning, analysis, and rehearsal is increasingly
apparent. We note the utility of simulation to track our tests, support the work and assess
how it went. We have responsibility to reflect, research, teach and archive the lessons we
have learned so they are accessible and visible. Only then can others build on our
successes and failures and so be able to practice further risk reduction.
This summer, the Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS) will
sponsor the first Grand Challenge International Conference in Modeling and Simulation
for Emergencies and Risky Enterprises (GC/MS:ICCRE) at the International Multi-
simulation Conference (IMc 10) in Ottawa. That event includes plans to advance interest
in these lifecycle challenges with various representatives of the McLeod Institutes for
Simulation Sciences (MISS).
Opportunities range from technology to language, behavior, politics, and culture.
Of particular interest is the role of simulation in risk prevention as well as in response and
recovery following major human-caused and natural disasters.
Time and travel expenses make face-to-face meetings difficult when people work
in different states, countries, and continents. Members of SCS and other professional
simulation organizations have, however, for the past five years, held numerous
discussions -- specifically on simulation and international cooperation-- at conferences in
Canada, Italy, Holland, Scotland, Turkey, and the US. These meetings have included
representatives from NASA, various military services, industry, the European Space
Agency (ESA) in Noordwyck, and with others engaged in major enterprises that include
harbors, shipbuilding, aviation, and aerospace. Kennedy Space Center and the National
Center for Simulation (NCS) have partnered, in part through the US Department of
Education and the European Union, on student, researcher and faculty international
exchanges with the MISS and with universities in Magdeburg, Germany, Marseille,
France, Genoa, Italy, and the US including the University of Central Florida. For most of our
highly dispersed effort, we must accept inconvenient time zones while relying primarily
on electronic media.
Large projects and major crises—all needing modeling and simulation-- are
seldom confined by geography and national boundaries. Looking toward better solutions,
we see mounting evidence that those who work with cross-functional and outside groups
possess better information and perform more effectively than those whose information
resources and experiences are limited to their own work units. Experts in one field can
fail to see options obvious to knowledgeable generalists or experts in other fields.
Although experience confirms that temporal distance is more challenging than spatial
distance and language differences pose further ."thought world" difficulties—there can be
no question that expanded external knowledge sharing as reported by Cummings (1) and
others is critical to performance improvement of large complex enterprises and systems.
The most telling comment overheard at the 2008 Interservice Industry Training
Simulation and Education Conference (UITSEC) was, "If you think you understand
simulation; you are not getting out enough."
As part of the solution, we must all foster and increase international exchange of
ideas that enhance skills, documentation, research, rehearsal, analysis, and review.
Success demands that we constantly challenge simulation technology improvement,
better understand and promote attention to interoperability and standards for equipment
interfaces.
Increasingly simulation teams do address some of the planning, development, and
operational needs of complex, consequential, geographically dispersed components and
widely separated international teams—including those working on planetary exploration.
In a crisis, many countries and organizations do call on the simulation industry for
models to clarify what might and has happened, provide simulation of evacuation routes
or define rebuilding needs.
Over time, and as budgets suffer, planning and training seldom remain at the top
of any list. Memories soon fade and other priorities intervene. In many countries there is
rarely an opportunity to plan ahead when all available resources are insufficient to feed
and shelter its citizens today.
We also experience projects waxing and waning, being put on hold, restarted or
forgotten. Space exploration is not alone. A healthy and sustainable environment, mass
transit, new energy and power sources, better affordable health care, sufficient clean
water and food and emergency preparedness seem trapped in similar pendulum swings of
interest and indifference. It is never easy to maintain enthusiasm for funding
infrastructure of systems or bridges or cities or education or exploration.
People move on to new projects. During a hiatus, information can become
irretrievably lost. Time is a thief. Technology advances while the life of major projects
lengthens. Often technology is the culprit—wire recordings, floppy disks, vinyl records,
8-millimeter film, Beta tape, hardware and software are soon obsolete. Companies and
contractors come and go.
Without funds for record keeping, we discard or store information in an out of the
way file. Some things get "excessed" and, to save them, people bring them home.
Footage of the Moon landing was recently and fortuitously so rediscovered. This happens
usefully and less dramatically from time to time. But still, we possess too little data from
our visits to the Moon and must, of necessity, reinvent knowledge and think about how to
manage it from here.
Moreover, while dispersed teams need good data, their time well spent, their
work tracked and stored safely and accessibly; that is easier said than done. For
space exploration, we began thinking of communication needs and synthetic
collaborative environments in terms of 20 years, but management reminded us that
we have all worked more than 20 years on the Space Shuttle. So we said 50 years
and then realized that 100 years may be a more accurate number. One of our
records managers has the challenge of developing the means to archive information
for 1000 years with the full understanding that the sole reason to store something is
to retrieve it. We have pieces and parts of such synthetic environment systems. None
are ones which we can be sure will be around for 100 years, much less a thousand
years. A colleague suggests, wryly but wisely, that we consider carving in stone.
As another example of the challenges we face, traditional problem solving states
that identifying the problem is halfway to solving it. This is not the experience of far-
flung teams working on disjointed elements of very large systems. It is not the experience
of those facing catastrophic situations. Both encounter problems that cannot be
definitively described, defined or solved, are essentially unique and, always,
consequential. Every effort to solve them has cost, impact, and, often, penalty. Rittel and
Webber [2] state that such attributes describe planning problems which "are inherently
'wicked'."
Although a reference to social policy, that idea resonates with our experience and
that of risk reduction managers everywhere as emergencies escalate. Solving one
"wicked" problem may create new, different, and more difficult problems. Marginal
short-term improvement can make needed structural change more difficult and more
expensive. The term "unintended consequences" gains prominence. Apparent similarities
among "wicked" problems can be deceiving and potentially dangerous. Moving off the
planet seems to be like going to the Moon during the Apollo era but it is not. The
technologies, teams, systems and subsystems are different. Direct transfer of any past
solutions might prove useless and even harmful.
NASA, as everywhere, struggles with "wicked" problems aware, perhaps, that
others down the hall, across the city or ocean may have a useful clue. That is what
outreach though professional organizations tries to address by deliberately increasing
networks of diverse and expert colleagues, reliable information resources, and the
credibility and visibility of the work. This matters because success depends on more than
technology.
Our worldviews, knowledge, skills, experience, biases, geography, and health
determine what and how we think, the choices we make, how we select ideas for research
or development and the methods we follow. These factors --even how we feel on a given
day--frame the variables we consider and can obscure experiences and ideas that might
alter findings and make us change our minds.
Daniel Goleman [3] notes that this problem is compounded because so much that
we are aware of happens outside our awareness. Being open to the knowledge and
insights of others is necessary to avoid either narrowness or "group think."
With "wicked" problems, we are told, the aim "is not Truth but improvement."
We muddle through. Gladwell [4] asserts that expert awareness--thinking without
thought -- combined with equally expert rational analysis might be an approach for
would-be solvers of such difficult, problems. But nowhere do we have a guarantee.
Professional problem solvers prefer answers. "Improvement" as a best solution is
a difficult idea to accept, but it may be all we can do.
With our experience in Space -- a hostile environment, daunting distances,
dangerous multi-decadal work of massive complexity-- comes the awareness, the good
news, that with simulation we see things from a new, previously unimagined perspective.
Simulation surprises us. In fact, surprise is its essence. We understand concepts that had
eluded us and grasp how to do work that seemed impossible.
Simulation does energize and make the job go better. Many European, Japanese
and US studies affirm that multidisciplinary teams modeling, optimizing and planning
intensively together-- from the beginning of projects-- show promise for innovation and
success in risky businesses. The numbers are both startling and credible. But few people
or organizations have seized this leadership opportunity.
Furthering the complexity and enhancing the challenge are the many disciplines;
we encounter now and will in the future. Twenty years ago, almost all simulation
"experts" were physicists, engineers and computer sciences. Those disciplines
predominate, but we have added psychologists, graphic artists, designers, and
specialists in acoustics, as well as game developers, marketers, analysts, storytellers,
and scenario writers. We will add other as yet undetermined disciplines. The
challenge of leveraging such growing diversity suggests the need for numerous
investigations including the currently under-researched sociology of complex and
risky situations.
The actual management of lifecycle projects, as with risk reduction management,
can be seen as mere common sense, "seat of the pants" work. It has taken several decades
for both the simulation and emergency management industries, to be taken seriously, to
be seen as professions built on ideas worth studying. Too few universities worldwide are
involved in necessary research and exploration of either. Of interest are overlapping
concerns about risk reduction and prevention, hazard assessment and communication as
well as research into operational management and, particularly, analysis of principles and
practice of complexity including crises.
Earthquakes, landslides and flood create 80% of the costly disasters that, for
example, impact Turkey each year-- socially, economically and politically. Following
the devastating earthquake of 1999, Turkey enhanced its approach working with the Red
Cross and the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), now part
of the Department of Homeland Security. They improved communication capability and
with FEMA, supported a substantial train-the-trainers program that has, following
analogue exercises and online capability, grown and developed to become a respected
university degree program through TUBiTAKE, Turkish Scientific, and Technical
Institutes Universities. The first 13 graduates found immediate employment in industry
and government. Only 8 universities in the US provide similar education and too few
exist around the world, especially in the southern hemisphere where disasters seem more
common and costly.
University level courses encourage systematic introduction to and treatment of
risk prevention in complex situations and systems. Related research findings directly aid
practice. The need increases for decision-support systems that include shared models,
team building, training exercises—especially online capability and innovations that can
be inexpensively applied anywhere and anytime.
Situations involving complexity require advanced simulation technology
addressing human performance, situational awareness and communication. Studies
advancing knowledge and modeling of air, land and water use policies as well geology,
oceanography, astrophysics, topography, rainfall, deforestation, health, agriculture, and
aquaculture benefit from simulation and add value to simulation of large complex
systems.
Emerging awareness and interest has enabled both simulation and risk
management to be accepted as higher education subjects in their own rights. Many
people realize distinct advantages from linking operational effectiveness with empirical
research. Decision-makers are seeing the benefit of recruiting people who are
academically trained and familiar with the research literature that underpins simulation
applied to massive complexity including major crises as well as very large systems.
There is much to learn from security, environmental and safety management
experiences involving natural disasters as well as biological and chemical accidents,
criminality, sabotage or financial crisis. Recently flawed economic models were
suggested as being at the base of much of our financial recession. That is a both a worry
and opportunity.
We all know that models lie. They are a simplification, a selected abstraction, of
reality. Nonetheless, all of us, everywhere base decisions on models—computational,
visual, tactile and written. We always hope that we do not leave anything out that impacts
the desired outcome especially when we deal with absolutely consequential
consequences.
John Sterman [5], a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) computer
scientist says, "we cannot validate any model in terms of truthfulness." The task, he sees,
is to "help one another develop skills and confidence --the courage-- to challenge the
models, uncover biases, find flaws in the models and work together for improvement."
This summer in Ottawa, we cannot solve our dilemmas but hope to share both
present and past les ons of modeling and simulation cooperation in international projects,
programs and ever. These could include aerospace exploration and military-civilian
emergency exercises and training as well as rapid response that involves unplanned for
remote assistance and training.
. We all need ideas for new and easier tools. Game technology is helping us with its
ability to disseminate high volumes of data as well as augmented reality; visualization
and story to capture and maintain interest, and, of course, its capacity to lower cost. We
need more research into multidisciplinary and highly dispersed teams, international
interoperability of data, simulation, hardware (including robots) and humans—standards
that reinforce reuse and usability.
Disaster studies including Apollo 1, Challenger, Columbia and Katrina all pointed
to failure of imagination. As "second-guessers", we easily see the poor decisions and
ineffective actions that plagued these events. Synthesizing and integrating imagination
systematically into our work –and thus our success—is, however, a challenge. Many
engineers report discomfort with the words imagination and creativity. Our Western
culture seems hostage to ancient pre-scientific thought that continue to value one
discipline over another and can hamper innovation. One such example is the human-
engineered split between art and technology seen in similar divisions between intuition
and analysis, perception and thought, empirical and rational reasoning and, even, within
organizations between those doing engineering design and others doing engineering
analysis.
Snow [6] notes that this split leads to lost potential, The analyst seeking
breakthrough cannot look solely to what has worked in the past but must use intuition
while the artist and humanist seeking to influence cannot be effective without attention to
logic, information, and analysis. Rudolf Arnheim [7] too, wrote that all thought is
perceptual in nature, that perception gathers things for thought and without such sensory
perceptual material "the mind has nothing to think with."
These all suggest challenge. If we are to take on a "wicked" problem; we need to
know why. We need to see the value of the story and understand our roles. When we
move off the planet, we will no longer be visitors elsewhere but residents. This is a truly
awesome idea. The changes that will follow are incalculable.
To develop means to achieve such a shared model we must start the correct story
correctly and keep it up-to-date and on target. That is easy to say but not so easy to do. It
matters because teams lacking a shared vision or model lose focus and can lose sight of
their mission and goals. Mishap studies show that technology is rarely the culprit-- that
teams without a shared model face a likelihood of failure.
A shared vision resonates, energizes and drives collaboration. A best practice is
a coherent documentation strategy to reinforce the story. Few organizations
institutionalize this activity. It calls for elevated skills in approximation and perceptual
exploration as well as verifiable information and attention to the links among knowledge,
communication, learning, and reasoning.
But if done well, such a shared model challenges our thinking and elicits ideas on
how best to keep the momentum going. With it, an organization can tell the correct story
in terms of logic and surprise to evoke right action. When such a story works, in time,
no one remembers where it began or with whom. That is alright because the listener's
story is what matters. What really matters is what the listener does.
It takes discipline, skill and effort to create that story and make it so clear, so
sound intellectually and emotionally that new people can carry out the mission for years
and years telling, retelling with less and less attribution and acting on it as their own. This
"wicked problem" is no job for amateurs.
Interactivity is also a difficult issue and is not a job for amateurs. It requires skill in
the little known practice of persistent, unending, give and take. Interaction has its basis in
Newtonian physics. Every action has a reaction and that is what matters. This further
underscores that it is what the listener does that matters, not what the speaker says.
Interactivity requires perception of what happens in the time between the action and
reaction. It is how an actor on stage reacts to another actor and to the audience's reaction.
Endless choices are reflected in a moment's hesitation or clear determination, in
puzzlement, anger, despair or glee as a person or team reacts to a surprising threat or
unexpected opportunity.
A friend once remarked that the simulator had been the unsung hero of Apollo 13. It
is true. NASA engineers on the ground used their experience, and more importantly,
reflection and their simulation research to prevent disaster. NASA had to abort the plan
for Apollo 13 to be the third mission to land on the Moon when an explosion in an
oxygen tank crippled the spacecraft. The situation was grim. Needing to- devise a safe
return using the lunar module, as a "life raft"-despite limited power, heat or potable
water—was no simple answer. Using simulation, NASA engineers called on everything
they knew to both enable the astronauts to orbit the Moon in a slingshot maneuver and
also take advantage of what power could be coaxed out of the ailing spacecraft in order to
bring them home. The task was compounded by a complicated series of switch throws
and circuit breaker pulls that had proven to be too time consuming in an Apollo 10
training simulation that left the "virtual crew dead". It was reflection and, research
following that undesirable event that resulted in a new activation list cutting procedures
to a feasible minimum. NASA used the new procedure although it was not yet certified,
and it did its job.
The simulation technology that helped save the crew is scarcely remembered. It
proved to be unobtrusive and undemanding of attention. That is an appropriate use of
appropriate technology setting the standard for simulation that includes international
cooperation supporting risky enterprises and crises.
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